VENTURE MOLIYALASHTIRISH JARAYONIDA RISKLARNI BOSHQARISH MEXANIZMLARI VA ULARNING SAMARADORLIGI

VENTURE MOLIYALASHTIRISH JARAYONIDA RISKLARNI BOSHQARISH MEXANIZMLARI VA ULARNING SAMARADORLIGI

Авторы

  • Abduxamid Bektemirov

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20855090

Ключевые слова:

venchur kapital, moliyalashtirish, risklarni boshqarish, bosqichma-bosqich moliyalashtirish, sindikatlash, kompleks tekshiruv, konvertatsiya qilinadigan imtiyozli aksiyalar, kelishuvning asosiy shartlari bayonnomasi, investitsiyadan chiqish riski, startaplar, agentlik muammosi, axborot assimetriyasi

Аннотация

Mazkur maqolada venchur moliyalashtirish jarayonida yuzaga keladigan asosiy risklar, ularni boshqarish
mexanizmlari va ushbu mexanizmlarning iqtisodiy samaradorligi tahlil qilinadi. Venchur kapital bozori yuqori noaniqlik,
axborot assimetriyasi, agentlik muammolari, texnologik va bozor risklari, shuningdek chiqish noaniqligi bilan tavsiflanadi.
Maqolada “risk-instrument-samaradorlik” integratsiyalashgan modeli ishlab chiqilgan bo‘lib, venture bitimlarida risklarni
kamaytirish samaradorligi nafaqat kapitalni himoya qilish, balki istiqbolli startaplarni erta bosqichda qo‘llab-quvvatlash
bilan muvozanatlashgan bo‘lishi lozimligi asoslangan.

Биография автора

Abduxamid Bektemirov

Sharof Rashidov nomidagi
Samarqand davlat universiteti dotsenti,
iqtisodiyot fanlari bo‘yicha falsafa doktori

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Загрузки

Опубликован

2026-06-01
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