COMPETITION IN THE INFORMATION MARKET: MONOPOLY TRENDS AND THE DIGITAL PLATFORM ECONOMY

Abstract

This article examines whether Uzbekistan’s competition-policy architecture can adequately address concentration
in multi-sided digital markets. Employing the Rochet–Tirole two-sided platform model and Schmalensee’s analysis
of single- and multi-homing, the study shows that conventional tools — the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, the standard
Lerner Index, and the SSNIP test — misstate market power when consumer-facing prices are zero. Using UNDP and
MEF structural data and case evidence from Uzum Market, Yandex Go/Eats, and the Payme–Click–TBC Bank cluster, the
paper demonstrates that Uzbek platforms apply asymmetric, elasticity-proportional pricing consistent with the generalized
Rochet–Tirole Lerner formula.