DIVIDEND SIYOSATINI SHAKLLANTIRISHDA FOYDA SIFATI VA FOYDANI BOSHQARISHNING TA’SIRI
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18362228Keywords:
dividend siyosati, foydani boshqarish, foyda sifati, aksiyadorlar boyligi, korxona qiymati, moliyaviy boshqaruv, dividend to‘lovlari, panel ma’lumotlar tahlili, empirik tahlil, agentlik nazariyasi, signal berish nazariyasi.Abstract
Mazkur maqolada dividend siyosati, foydani boshqarish va foyda sifati o‘rtasidagi o‘zaro bog‘liqlik empirik
jihatdan tahlil qilinadi. Tadqiqotning maqsadi dividend siyosatining aksiyadorlar boyligi hamda korxona qiymatiga ta’sirini
foyda sifati nuqtai nazaridan aniqlashdan iborat. Tadqiqot kvantitativ yondashuv asosida olib borilib, panel ma’lumotlar
tahlili usuli qo‘llanilgan. Empirik tahlil 2015–2025-yillarda fond bozorida faoliyat yuritgan aksiyadorlik jamiyatlarining
moliyaviy ko‘rsatkichlariga asoslangan. Dividend siyosati dividendlarning sof foydaga nisbati orqali baholanib, foydani
boshqarish darajasi modifikatsiyalangan Jones modeli asosida, foyda sifati esa Dechow va Dichev modeli yordamida
aniqlangan. Tadqiqot natijalari foyda sifati dividend siyosatiga ijobiy, foydani boshqarish esa salbiy ta’sir ko‘rsatishini
tasdiqlaydi.
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